continually blocked up. . . ." On October 27th, 1927, the *Cuvantul* related how extensive frauds were found to have been committed by higher railway officials in Transylvania, and that the affair was being hushed up so that these persons might not be incriminated.

On March 3rd, 1928, the same paper enlarged on the collapse of the railway bridge over the Milcov, near Focşani, the construction of which had been entrusted to a favourite of M. V. Bratianu who, so far, instead of being punished, had been appointed to another post. The *Argus* of February 20th, 1929, in an article entitled "What has been done with the Railways?" cites the following facts: "It was decided to illuminate the railway cars with methane gas, and lamps and instruments were bought for this purpose. All these remain unused in the warehouses because it has since been found out that methane gas could not be used for such a purpose. . . . Lathes of a value of 40 millions were ordered; this is a quantity likely to suffice for a period of ten to fifteen years. . . . There are some 280 trucks loaded with corrugated iron. As the annual requirements of the railway administration are about two to three truckloads, this stock is likely to last a century. . . ."

With the advent of the National Peasant Party to power a slight improvement set in, but it was too much to expect that a system which had become traditional could be altered in the course of a few years. The *Cuvantul* of March 31st, 1929, commenting on the resignation of the general manager of the railways, declared that this was a good beginning. "So far our railways were not an institution for furthering travel and facilitating transport, but a counting-house for the sale, at exorbitant prices, of all kinds of manufactures of the various industrial firms associated with the Liberal Party. . . ." In previous articles the *Cuvantul* had described how the railway administration, being under the control of partisans of the Liberal Party, the latter had done everything in its power to promote the interests of members of that party to the detriment of those of the State. The carelessness and remissness of the railway administration may be gauged by the fact that it positively discouraged traffic on its own lines, and diverted it to foreign countries

by a policy of high rates. Thus in January, 1927, the *Argus* complained that timber exports from Bucovina, instead of being forwarded for shipment via Galatz, were being diverted to Dantzig because (owing to the new rates) the cost of transport for one truckload of timber to the first port amounted to 9,500 lei, while the freightage to the second port cost only 4,400 lei. In another article the complaints of the Transylvanian industrialists were aired, and these likewise complained that owing to high rates and lack of trucks they were losing their foreign trade. It was affirmed that only one-fifth of the number of trucks necessary for Transylvania had been allotted to that region, and that the shortage was made more acutely felt owing to the manifest favouritism attending the allocation of trucks. Moreover, trucks which had been slightly injured were not repaired promptly but shunted on to sidings, where they were left to rot and fall to pieces.

The neglect with which the traffic requirements of Transylvania were treated led industrialists of that region to the conclusion that this was a deliberate policy so that their rivals in the old kingdom might be protected from the influx of goods from Transylvania. (*Argus*, November 27th, 1926.)

A policy of excessive transport rates has been applied, which has wrought incredible harm to the railways by reducing traffic and fostering the development of motor road transport, which is rapidly increasing. The latter is proving a formidable rival to the railways, and competition has become so keen that the railway administration has thought of making use of motor railcars on some lines in order to provide increased services and attract some of the traffic it has lost back again, but though this scheme was mooted several years ago it was only recently that an order for a few steam railcars was given to a Birmingham firm.

In fact the railway administration has since 1927 shown a loss every year. Thus 1927 showed a deficit of 1,278,395,915 lei, 1928 of 1,625,634,902, 1929 of 981,635,257, 1930 of 1,286,001,744, while for 1931, according to the *Adeverul* of January 28th, 1932, it was reported that the deficit would be the largest so far recorded, for while expenditure had re-

mained stationary, the revenue was inferior by some 1,600 million lei. Since then it has been announced that the deficit had attained 2,000 millions, and that the year 1932 would also close with an equally large deficit. One of the causes of these huge deficits is that the State never pays its debts to the railway administration, in spite of the formal undertakings it assumed when the 1929 loan was floated. On the other hand the State insists on the railway administration paying into the State Treasury the savings it has effected by the reduction of the salaries of its officials. At the end of March, 1929, M. Vidrighin, a former director of the railways, published in the *Argus* a series of articles which explain some of the reasons why the exploitation of the railways is carried on at a loss. He thus pointed out that there are about four and a half millions of persons who make regular use of the railways, but of these some 800,000 are deputies, officials, pensioners, and military, who benefit by great reductions in the current fares, as do their families. So that some 1,200,000 persons, or about one-third of the regular users of the railways, are carried at a loss. Further, the law encouraging national industries provides that raw materials needed for them are to be carried to the factories at a rebate of 30 per cent, while goods despatched from these factories are to enjoy a 45 per cent reduction from the usual tariff. Thus a large part of the goods transported is handled at a loss. Losses are also incurred on official transport, which is mainly gratuitous.

To make good these losses the administration had hit on the simple contrivance of increasing the rates on goods as well as passenger fares, which expedient has resulted in a steady decrease in revenue. Thus in 1929 the total revenue amounted to 12,375,669,870 lei, in 1930 it had decreased to 11,291,600,463, and for 1931 it is reported that the revenue would again decrease by another 1,600 million lei. Passenger rates were so abnormally high that peasants could scarcely afford to travel by rail. For example, for a distance of 40 kms. a peasant would have to disburse 60 lei, a sum which it would have taken him two days to earn. To put a stop to the decrease in the traffic a drastic reduction of 40 to 60 per cent in the transport rates was recommended again

in the *Argus* of 14th May, 1932, and statistics were quoted to show that since 1927 freight rates had increased by 112.5 per cent, and these charges, which were estimated in 1929 to represent 5.2 per cent of the value of the goods handled, represented in 1931 as high a percentage as 10.2. Owing to the high transport charges there was a serious falling off in traffic; thus while 18,191,860 tons had been carried in 1930, there were only 16,403,536 tons handled in 1931. The *Argus* of 24th and 25th January, 1932 affirmed that railway charges on grain exported averaged 20 per cent of its value, while the cost of carrying timber often reached 40 per cent of its value.

A further reason why the railway administration cannot even cover its expenses is the high price which it has had to pay for its coal. So far it seems to have been under the tutelage and grip of the "Liberal" Party, the partisans of which forced it to buy the bulk of its coal at exorbitant prices from mines which belonged to them. Thus the *Cuvantul* of December 29th, 1928, affirmed that these "Liberal" companies received annually some two milliard lei for supplying coals at the extravagant price of 1,643 lei per ton. The *Lupta*, in an article published on May 14th or 15th, 1932, asserted that while in Rumania expenditure on fuel amounts to 14½ per cent of the total expenses of the railways, Germany expended only 6 per cent on this head, Poland 8 per cent, and Italy, a country totally deprived of coal, spends only 9½ per cent. The paper also complained that expenditure for the upkeep of rolling stock was inordinately high, amounting to 30.6 per cent. in Rumania, as against 12.7 per cent in Germany, 14.7 per cent in Austria, and 17.7 per cent in Poland.

The *Argus* of 24th April, 1932, relates how political influences are being exerted to bring pressure to bear on the railway administration so that it should place orders for a supply of lignite from mines in the valley of the Jiu, at a cost of some 100 millions per annum. This fuel was shown to be useless, and had to be burned mixed up with crude oil in the locomotives. Its purchase constitutes a downright waste, "but when repeated and weighty interventions are resorted

497 to we understand why the railway administration has not
661 yet excluded lignite from among the fuels of which it makes use. . . ." A close examination of the items of the expenditure would probably reveal undue liberality under certain heads. Thus the total expenditure for 1930 amounted to 12,577,602,209 lei, of which 2,700 millions were devoted to the upkeep and repair of rolling stock, 746 millions to the upkeep of the lines, 1,830 millions to fuel, 6,743 millions to salaries, wages, etc.

496 Out of the proceeds of the 1929 loan, some 4,751 million lei were earmarked for the reconditioning of the railways. The sum was to be employed for the renewal of the tracks, the purchase of rolling stock, the construction of new lines, and for the improvement and enlargement of workshops. Expenditure on this last item was exceedingly ill-advised, for the railway administration had entered into engagements with certain foreign firms, on the strength of which the latter had built repair-shops, such as the "Astra" Company at Arad, the "Lemaître" workshops at Reşiţa, and the Franco-Romana Co. at Braila. In 1929 there still remained four outstanding contracts expiring in 1935, and guaranteeing a yearly expenditure of 640 millions for constructing locomotives, and two other contracts expiring in 1939 which provided for the repairing of locomotives, of a value of 335 millions. As soon as the railway administration was able to use its new workshops it proceeded to disregard these contracts, and as a result these private firms had to close down and dismiss their workmen. The *Argus* of 11th May, 1932 denounces the railway administration for its indefensible attitude in the following terms:

"These industries have suffered immense losses. Their staff had to be dismissed, and they have been rendered incapable of meeting their engagements. All of them will put in claims for damages, and we can hardly doubt that Justice, taking into consideration the contracts made with the railways, will be found to pronounce in their favour. Who is to pay the damages? Naturally the State, which is also going to lose the taxes which it would have raised on the contracts had they been carried out. But the greatest loss consists in

CHAPTER II

3. Transport

315 For the transport of oil both for internal consumption and for export, Rumania relied largely upon railways, and except between the wells and the refineries, only a relatively small proportion was transported by pipeline. The three main pipelines were State-owned and were laid mainly for the transport of oil for export: one for white products from Ploești to Constanța with a capacity of 810,000 tons per annum, and two lines for crude and heavy residue from Ploești to Giurgiu with a combined capacity of 300,000 tons per annum.

The total quantity of oil through three lines in 1938 was 800,000 tons: 13 per cent. of the exports from Constanța and 27 per cent. of those from Giurgiu were handled in this way as well as the internal transport of some 184,000 tons of crude oil. The Rumanian fleet of 8,000 tank cars was ample to handle all the oil transported by rail.

[497]

The main channel for exports was Constanța on the Black Sea, through which 3·3 million tons were exported in 1938, as compared with only 935,000 tons through Giurgiu for transport up the Danube.

C. THE INDUSTRY IN WAR-TIME

1. General

315 722 The war has completely altered the orientation of the Rumanian oil industry: normal export trade routes through Constanța and the Mediterranean were cut and exports to most countries in Continental Europe came under German control as soon as the Germans were astride the Danube at Belgrade, and the main railways through Poland and Yugoslavia. Not only were normal export channels disrupted, but the Rumanian oil industry lost the services of all its foreign technical experts, and could no longer get from the United States supplies of drilling and refinery equipment on which it had very largely relied.

The inevitable result of all this was that in spite of the urgent need for increased production and all German efforts to obtain this, the downward production trend was not halted in 1941, and only 5,483 million tons were produced. That year was, however, one of abnormal difficulties owing to the necessity for reorganising the industry on a war-time basis, rapidly rising prices of almost everything but oil, shortage of man-power owing to Rumanian mobilisation, the difficulty of getting equipment, and above all an abnormally severe winter which hampered transport so severely that production had to be restricted for lack of storage. By dint of continuous German pressure and increased control of the industry, production in 1942 probably reached 5.6 million tons.

Internal consumption has, however, not decreased and is thought to be running at a rate of 2 million tons a year, which leaves between 3 and 3½ million tons available for the Axis and neutral countries in Europe. Italy gets approximately one million tons a year, Germany two million tons, and small quantities go to Switzerland, Sweden and Turkey.

315 439 Except during the winter months when navigation on the Danube is suspended, the majority of exports to Italy go by pipeline to Giurgiu and thence by barge to river ports in Yugoslavia or Hungary for transhipment to Italy by rail-tank car. One of the results of the reorientation of Rumania's oil export trade has been the greatly increased use made of the river port of Giurgiu.

[14a]

313 cooperage and boxmaking plants. The distribution of these is shown in Table II, although separation of the sawmills from the other industries is not possible. There were also three match factories, which covered internal requirements, and four wood-distillation plants, two of which, situated at Margina and Resita, appeared to be relatively large concerns.

5. Exports

313 439 Rumania's timber exports between 1935 and 1938 averaged 1·8 million cubic metres per annum, which was 5 per cent. of total European exports, and gave her the leading place among south-east European countries. Almost 90 per cent. of total exports were conifers, whilst, as the following table shows, sawn goods made up by far the greater part :—

Categories	*Average annual exports 1935–38 (in '000 cubic metres)*	
Sawn goods	1,280	71
Firewood	222	12
Hewn goods	113	6
Sawlogs	71	4
Boxboard, etc	37	2
Pitwood	31	2
Pulpwood	26	1½
Sleepers	21	1½
Total	1,801	100

Exports were made to many countries, including South America, but the most important customers were Hungary, Germany, U.K., Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Greece. Trade with Germany in the immediate years prior to the war was tending to increase.

6. Employment

313 [+64] It was estimated by a qualified expert that the forests gave direct or indirect employment to 750,000 people (about 10 per cent. of the total labour force) in forest work, transport of forest produce and in the timber industry and trade. At least 250,000 were engaged in actual forestry work, but this number probably included part-time and seasonal workers.

7. Transport

[505] [498] Water transport played but a small part in the carriage of timber, carrying only about 700,000 cubic metres per annum. By far the greater reliance was placed on transport by railways, and some 10 million cubic metres were carried by this service each year.

II. PRESENT SITUATION

Under war conditions Rumania has been faced with increasing difficulties for her supply of timber, and as most of the quantities now made available are required for home consumption, she has very little significance as an exporter.

The forest area lost by the cession of part of Transylvania is estimated to be about 1·4 million ha., and as this area accounted for 25 per cent. of pre-war production its loss is of serious consequence. It is estimated that under existing circumstances the maximum annual cut that is possible, if the present forest area is to be maintained, is 12 million cubic metres.

About 210 timber-processing concerns, of which 176 were sawmills, were also lost with Northern Transylvania, but in view of the over-expansion of the timber industry these losses are probably of less serious consequence.

CHAPTER VIII

496 8. Bucarest—Oltenița, a port station on the Danube.

9. Bucarest—Giurgiu, an important Danube port opposite Ruse (Bulgaria).

10. Arad—Oradea—Satu Mare—Halmeu—Câmpulung pe Tisa—Sighet—Valea Vinului—Vișeul de Sus—Borșa.

11. Satu Mare—Baia Mare—Jibou—Dej—Apahida.

12. Dej—Beclean—Ilva Mica—Vatra Dornei—Dărmănești.

3. Staff

497 In 1938 the personnel of the Rumanian State Railways was as follows :—

General and Divisional Headquarters	8,037
Maintenance and Supervision of Permanent Way	13,730
Engine Crews	4,705
Sheds and Workshops	7,584
Main Workshops	21,260
Stations	20,947
Train Staff	6,081
Various	2,322
Total	84,666

4. Locomotives and Rolling-Stock

493 In 1939 there were 3,383 standard-gauge locomotives (2,899 tender type and 484 tank type). As regards narrow-gauge locomotives, figures for 1939 are not available, but in 1938 there were 108 (17 tender type and 91 tank type). Railcars in 1938 totalled 236, of which 8 were steam-operated.

ROLLING-STOCK 1938

(1939 *figures, where available, in brackets*)

	Standard Gauge	*Narrow Gauge*
Total No. of Wagons	62,487	920
Ordinary Wagons	52,107 (53,320)	917 (881)
of which covered	22,670 (23,233)	127 (153)
open	29,437 (30,097)	790 (728)
Special Wagons	1,666	3
of which Tank (state owned)	1,142	3
Privately owned	8,714	—
of which oil tank	8,613	—
Passenger Coaches	3,711 (3,449)	137 (150)

In view of the importance of the oil traffic, it should be noted that there were about 10,000 tank wagons (8,500 owned by the oil companies and 1,500 by the railways).

Coal is the principal fuel used by the railways, consumption of various fuels in 1938 being :—

Coal	944,000 tons.
Brown Coal	501,000 tons.
Heavy Oil	233,000 tons.
Petrol	7,000 tons.
Wood Fuel	19,000 cubic metres.

5. Traffic

497 The following figures relate to the year 1938—

(a) *Goods (Standard and Narrow-Gauge Lines)*

No. of tons	*Tons—km.*	*Average Haul per Ton—km.*
27,680,179	5,795,042	209

The principal goods normally conveyed by the Rumanian State Railways are petroleum and petroleum products, coal, firewood, timber, grain and building materials.

[40a]

(b) *Passengers*

●497 In 1938, 48.7 million passengers were carried over a total distance of 3,765 million km. (2,339 million miles) for an average journey of 77 km. (48 miles).

II. War-time Changes

1. Territorial Changes

496 722 Few railways have so far undergone greater changes, both on account of territorial transfers and alterations in traffic flows as a result of the war than the Rumanian State Railways. Firstly, in 1940 the system suffered considerable dismemberment, in June 1,665 km. (1,032 miles) of standard and 65 km. (40 miles) of narrow gauge in Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina were taken over by the U.S.S.R.; then in September the Vienna Award resulted in the transfer of a large part of Transylvania, including 1,750 km. (985 miles) of standard and 355 km. (220 miles) of narrow gauge line to Hungary, and 70 km. (43 miles) of the Southern Dobruja line were ceded to Bulgaria. Following the German attack on the U.S.S.R. in June, 1941, the Bessarabian and Northern Bucovina lines were recovered in the early autumn of that year and, at the beginning of 1942, the Germans placed the control and operation of the railways in the newly created province of Transnistria in the hands of the Rumanian State Railways. The Transnistrian system consists in essence of the Odessa-Zhmerinka section of the Odessa-Kiev-Lwow main line and all branches (including the Zhmerinka-Mogilev line) on both sides as far as the Dniester (frontier with Rumania) in the west, and the Bug (frontier with the Ukraine) in the east.

Apart from Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina and Transnistria, the Rumanian State Railways have not so far suffered any substantial direct physical damage. The Russians on their occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina in June 1940 at once converted all lines from the standard European to the Russian gauge, a task which was made easier by the fact that the system had, prior to 1920, been Russian gauge. The Russians, in spite of the resultant difference in gauge, insisted on taking over all standard-gauge locomotives and rolling-stock formerly in use in the territories, even where this had already been withdrawn by the Rumanians. The Russians during their subsequent evacuation of these provinces, and also of Transnistria, withdrew or destroyed virtually all their locomotives and rolling-stock, and on the whole effectively damaged or destroyed the track, bridges, stations and equipment. The Rumanians, therefore, found themselves faced with the task of reconstructing and reconverting back to standard gauge the lines taken over, and of providing the necessary locomotives, rolling stock equipment and staff to work the traffic. The Transnistrian system from the railway point of view represented a liability rather than an asset.

It was not until the end of 1941 that the lines in Bessarabia and Bucovina were all re-opened, and until early in 1942 that traffic was being worked to and from Transnistria. The Transnistrian system possesses a measure of autonomy, believed in practice to be mainly legal and financial, but for practical purposes the lines are operated as an integral part of the Rumanian system. The transfer of the Transylvanian lines to Hungary and the Southern Dobruja line to Bulgaria were effected without any physical damage and, as far as is known, no locomotives or rolling-stock were handed over by the Rumanians in either case. The change was primarily administrative, but

496 normal traffic was disorganised for several weeks
722 owing to troop movements, the transfer of population, evacuation of equipment and other problems incidental to the transfer of the territory.

● 497 All these changes of necessity caused con-
722 siderable problems, particularly administrative and considerably affected traffic working. Of the four Divisions in 1939, most of the Cluj Division including Cluj itself and the Turda-Cluj-Oradea section of the Bucarest-Ploești-Cluj-Oradea-Budapest main line, together with part of the Timișoara Division, were transferred to Hungary. Half of the Cernăuți Division, including Cernăuți itself and a section of the Bucarest-Ploești-Cernăuți-Lwow main line, was transferred to the U.S.S.R., and parts of the Bucarest Division were transferred to all three countries. The operation of the system was reorganised and centralised under a military directorate in Bucarest, to which German liaison officers have been attached to co-ordinate working and ensure that all German requirements are met. While these officers must presumably have certain powers, and there are also German officers—thought to be equivalent to R.T.O.—at the more important junctions and traffic centres, there is no evidence that the Rumanian State Railways have ever been under direct German control, or that their autonomy has been seriously impaired.

The Rumanian Authorities have had to cope with all these territorial changes and resultant administrative problems during a period when traffic was both considerably heavier than, and the flows entirely different from, before the war. The closing of the sea routes between Rumania and Germany in September 1939—and since June 1940 largely with Italy and the Northern Mediterranean coast—resulted in the transfer to the Danube or to the direct rail routes, of all traffic between Rumania and Germany, Italy and the rest of Europe. Owing to the closing of the Bucarest - Ploești - Cernăuți - Lwow - Przemysl - Cracow-Silesia main line from September 1939 to December 1941 (except for a trickle of traffic for a few months) on account of the occupation of Eastern Poland by the U.S.S.R., the Bucarest-Ploești-Brașov-Coșna Mică-Teiuș-Cluj-Oradea or Teiuș-Arad-Curtici, and Ploești-Bucarest-Orșova-Timișoara lines were called upon to handle all this traffic. An exception was that sent via the Danube, which had to be rail-hauled to and from the Danube ports, particularly Giurgiu and Orșova. Oil has been, apart possibly from military movements, the most important single traffic; and, in general, German traffic has been sent via the Ploești-Teiuș-Oradea and Arad routes and Italian traffic via the Bucarest-Timișoara route.

From early in 1941 when the Germans began to move into the Balkans, first for the Yugoslav/Greek and then the Russian campaign, the Rumanian railways have had to carry in addition large numbers of troops and quantities of supplies. During the Yugoslav campaign when all routes to Greece and Bulgaria via this latter country were closed, the only all-rail route (apart from ferries over the Danube) into Bulgaria was that via the Cernavodă Bridge and the Dobruja. Rumania served an important rôle as a base for the attack on the Ukraine, and as the German front moved eastwards the Bucarest-Ploești-Buzău-Cernăuți, Buzău-Galați-Teghina and Bucarest-Constanța lines became important as supply routes to the Eastern Front.

2. New Construction and Improvements of the Railway System

499 The lines, which with the exception of the Bucarest-Ploești-Câmpina and Ploești-Buzău sec-

499 tions, were virtually all single track, were never designed or equipped to carry traffic on this scale. An elaborate programme of new construction and improvement works, certain features of which had been contemplated by the Rumanians for some years, was put in hand to increase the capacity of the various routes. On the routes to the west, the doubling of the Câmpina-Braşov section was pressed forward rapidly and completed by January, 1941, and work is also reported to be in hand on the doubling of sections of the Braşov-Sighişoara-Copşa Mică-Teiuş line. On the routes to the east, the Ploeşti-Buzău double-track section has been extended as far as Adjud on the Cernăuţi line and N. Filipescu on the Galaţi-Tighina line. In addition, extra sidings and new passing loops have been built, and improved signalling and telegraph and telephone circuits have been installed to increase the capacity of the single-track sections. A considerable mileage of line has also been relaid with heavier rails to permit of the use of more powerful locomotives. Work is also in hand on the construction of a number of new lines, including a new line 202 km. (125 miles) long from Bucarest via Videle-Roşiori-Caracal to Craiova, to shorten and relieve the existing route via Piteşti; new lines from Bumbeşti to Livăseni and Deva to Vălcău; a new line from Ploeşti to Târgoviste and certain new routes in Bessarabia. Work on several of these lines is understood to be well advanced, and the Bumbeşti-Livăseni and Bucarest-Caracal-Craiova lines are, according to the latest evidence, likely to be completed in the autumn of 1943. Also the long-projected train-ferry between Giurgiu and Ruse was finally brought into use in June, 1941.

497 722 In spite of the relief granted by these improvements, the heavy volume of oil, military and other urgent traffic could be worked only by severe restrictions on ordinary passenger and freight traffic. The restrictions have inevitably varied from time to time and been most severe during periods of heavy military movements and during the winter when the weather has made operating difficult. Passenger-train services are more or less on a skeleton basis, and are at about one-third of pre-war level; yet the principal long-distance trains still carry restaurant and sleeping-cars. Certain restrictions ahve been imposed on travel and the restrictions on freight traffic have had serious economic consequences, particularly on the distribution of firewood. The shortage of locomotives and wagons, particularly since the recovery of Bessarabia and Northern-Bucovina and the taking over of Transnistria, has been acute. In the early part of the war the tank-wagon position was very difficult, but this has been eased by the construction of new vehicles by Germany, and by German requisitioning of wagons from the occupied countries; but apart from this the wagon position has been continually difficult, though a factor of considerable assistance has been that many of the military and supply movements have been into or through Rumania from Germany, and in consequence the Rumanian State Railways have not had to supply the wagons for these trains. The locomotive position has been met by the transfer of locomotives into Rumania by Germany; in addition to German locomotives, requisitioned French locomotives are said to be stationed at various sheds in Rumania.

The Rumanian State Railways are now in an anomalous position. Although a large programme of new construction and improvements has been carried out, heavy claims are being made on the system by Axis war traffic, with the result that the facilities available for ordinary commercial traffic

CHAPTER VIII

and for passenger travel are severely limited. However, unless there is severe destruction in the later stages of the war, in the long run the Rumanians are bound to benefit from the capital investment in railways, and from the new construction and improvements which have been carried out to meet Axis needs. These improvements though planned long ago, could never have been carried out with the limited financial and technical resources previously available, and could not have been executed so quickly but for German assistance.

B. ROADS

Rumania's road system was, by Western European standards, very poorly developed before the war, there being only one International motor road which formed the continuation of the route from Hungary via Oradea Mare—Cluj—Sibiu—Braşov—Bucarest—Giurgiu and a branch line Bucarest—Olenita. Apart from this one major road, the system consists of untarred roads, many of which are in a poor state of repair.

The total length of the road system was reported early in 1943 to be 82,098 km. (51,016 miles), with only 12 per cent. in good state of repair, 22 per cent. being mediocre and the remainder in bad condition. Ownership of the total network is divided as follows :—

State roads	..	11,465 km. (7,118 miles)
Provincial roads	..	26,181 km. (16,272 miles)
Communal roads	..	44,452 km. (27,620 miles)

in 1936 there were some 34,000 cars registered.

The development of the road system has long been the dream of Rumanian propagandists, particularly as a stimulus to tourist traffic, but before the war no large-scale development could be embarked upon because of the lack of available capital.

Since the war, work has been started on an ambitious programme of road development, the objects of which are to improve communications between urban systems and to link the system with the International road network.

An Italo-Rumanian road company has started work on the Rumanian sector of one of the future trans-European roads, Trieste—Beograd—Turnu Severin—Bucarest—Constanţa, while under a five-year plan, with an expenditure of 75 md. lei, some 5,000 km. (3,100 miles) of road are to be modernised with the help of German and Italian contractors.

C. SHIPPING

1. Introduction

A high percentage of Rumania's foreign trade is water-borne (55 per cent. in 1937), as not only is she situated on the Black Sea, but the Danube traverses the full west to east length of the country forming an important traffic route and link with Central Europe.

The following table shows comparative tonnages for sea and river traffic in 1937 and 1938 :—

	1937	1938
	'000 *metric tons*	
Sea :		
Imports	622	540
Exports	6,918	5,222
River :		
Imports	1,890	1,568
Exports	3,161	2,688

As a result of the cutting-off of overseas markets since 1940 an increasing share of the country's